Case Title: Dr Mohinder Kumar vs The Chairman, NABARD (Writ Petition 1635 of 2021)

The Bombay High Court last week, came to the rescue of an employee of National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), who challenged the penalty of ‘Reprimand’ imposed on him by the Central Complaints Committee (CCC) for ‘video recording’ his female colleagues who often ‘disturbed’ the working hours by ‘sitting together, giggling, gossiping and singing.’

A division bench noted that the CCC by its order passed on June 30, 2020 held that the conduct of the petitioner – Dr Mohinder Kumar did not amount to ‘sexual harassment’ as prescribed under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH), however, it recommended action against him.

On this very recommendation, the competent authority, Chief General Manager of NABARD imposed a penalty of ‘Reprimand’ on Kumar as the CCC in its report stated that his ‘conduct of shooting video, though did not amount to sexual harassment but was also not justified.’  In view of the recommendations, the Chief General Manager of NABARD had imposed a major penalty (under Reprimand) of ‘compulsory retirement’ on Kumar and he was subsequently retired by the bank.

Challenging the findings of the CCC and the penalty by the competent authority, Kumar relied on section 13(2) of the POSH Act, which provides that when the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) arrives at a conclusion that the allegations against a person are not proved, then it has to recommend to the employer that no action is required in the said matter.

Considering the facts of the case, the judges in their January 12 order, said, “Upon going through the order of penalty imposed by the Competent Authority dated September 24, 2020, it is evident that the disciplinary authority has imposed the penalty of ‘Reprimand’ solely on the basis of the recommendation made by the CCC. The CCC is a Committee specially constituted to address the grievances of sexual harassment, hence once the Committee has formed an opinion that the conduct of the Petitioner did not constitute ‘sexual harassment’, it could not have recommended any action against the Petitioner. It should have simply closed the matter and dismissed the complaint.”  The court stated that the CCC in the instant case, has acted beyond its powers.

“The CCC has exceeded its jurisdiction by making recommendation to the Competent Authority to take suitable action against the Petitioner. Similarly, acting on the recommendation of the CCC, the Competent Authority has committed an error by imposing penalty of ‘Reprimand’ without application of his mind or making any independent inquiry, thus the order passed by the Chief General Manager and Competent Authority dated September 24, 2020 deserves to be quashed and set aside,” the judges held.

With these observations, the bench quashed and set aside the penalty imposed on Kumar.

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Special Leave Petition (C) No. 17936 of 2025

Upholds maximum statutory limitation of six months period for filing sexual harassment complaint

The Supreme Court on September 12, 2025, ruled that the sexual harassment alleged by a faculty member of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Science against the Vice Chancellor of the University, is time-barred as the alleged incident happened in April 2023, but the complaint was filed in December 2023, after a maximum statutory limitation of six months prescribed under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.

It was argued that while the last alleged sexual harassment took place in April 2023, the consequent administrative actions, such as her removal from the post of Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory and Governance Studies or inquiry by the Executive Council over the misutilisation of UGC funds, also constituted acts of sexual harassment and therefore, the complaint was not time-barred.

However, the Court held that the last alleged incident in April 2023 was a complete act in itself, and the subsequent administrative measures, although they may have given the impression that it was done as a matter of retaliation and were linked to previous acts, did not constitute sexual harassment.

“The alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter. The administrative measures of August 2023, were independent and were collective decisions of the NFCG and the Executive Council which cannot be solely attributed to the Vice-Chancellor. The said decision may have caused inconvenience to the appellant or may have given an impression that they are in line with previous acts of harassment, but they were not part of the continued sexual harassment. The subsequent events have no connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as such, fall clearly out of the preview of acts or behaviours amounting to sexual harassment. In this way, the incident of April 2023, remains the last event related to sexual harassment.”

While the Court upheld the decision of the division bench of the Calcutta High Court that the complaint is time-barred, it directed that this judgment shall be made a part of the Vice-Chancellor’s resume, a compliance with which shall be strictly ensured by him personally.

“In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as the discussion, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court committed no error of law in restoring the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the appellant is time barred and is liable to be dismissed. It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget the wrongdoing. The wrong which has been committed against the appellant may not be investigated on technical grounds, but it must not be forgotten. In this view of the matter, we direct that the incidents of alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever.

Thus, it is directed that this judgment shall be made part of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance of which shall be strictly ensured by him personally.”

The complainant was made by Vaneeta Patnaik, a faculty member, against Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, the VC.

A bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale observed that there may have been a wrong on the part of the Vice-Chancellor, but the complaint was not investigated on technical grounds.

In this case, the Appellant alleged sexual harassment at the hands of the Vice-Chancellor, the last act of which was allegedly committed in April 2023. But since she formally filed a complaint on December 26, 2023, the Local Complaints Committee rejected it as time-barred, against which she filed a writ petition.

The single judge allowed her petition and directed a fresh hearing on the grounds that she was subjected to threat of detrimental treatment in her employment and the Vice-Chancellor created an intimidating, offensive and hostile work environment for her.

It was the case of the Appellant that she was subjected to administrative actions after April 2023, which formed a continuing act of sexual harassment. The Appellant alleged that the incidents began in July 2019. In August, she was removed as Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory and Governance Studies. During this time, a one-man inquiry commission was set up by the Executive Council to investigate an allegation of misutilisation of the UGC grant. It was resolved that a sum of Rs. 1 lac be refunded immediately by the NUJS.

The division bench said that the alleged incidents after April 2023 did not constitute sexual harassment.

This was the specific issue before the Court as to whether subsequent actions constituted sexual harassment within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. The Court also acknowledged that the Appellant herself recognised that she had delayed in filing the complaint.

It said: “The appellant, in filing the complaint, also moved an application for condonation of delay stating that there were “mitigating circumstances” which she had attempted to resolve within the institution and when she failed, she then filed the complaint. The very fact that the appellant was conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed, proves that she herself treated the act of April 2023, to be the last incident of sexual harassment and as such, tried to explain the delay in filing the complaint.”

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Petitioner was working as District Programme Officer, Kushinagar when he was suspended by an order passed by Chief Secretary Child Development and Nutrition, Uttar Pradesh on grounds that words said do not amount to sexual harassment, the internal complaint committee was not duly constituted under the Section 4 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.

Counsel for petitioner submitted that as per the statement of the complainant, the petitioner had called her fatty and had often suggested that she go on evening walks with him and also invited her to have meals with him. It was argued that this by itself does not constitute sexual harassment. It was also argued that procedure prescribed for dealing with such complaints was not followed by the internal complaints committee.

Per contra, counsel for respondent argued that body shaming of the complainant and all events taken together constituted sexual harassment under the Act. It was argued that since the petitioner’s statement was recorded, he could not now say that he could not put up his defence. He should have filed an application before the internal complaints committee for cross-examination.

An FIR lodged against the petitioner regarding sexual harassment of another female was also brought on record before the Court to argue that many women working in petitioner’s department have felt uncomfortable. The Court observed that suspension is not a punishment but a measure to prevent the delinquent from influencing the proceedings against him. “An employee is placed under suspension by the employer only to ensure that he is not able to influence the enquiry in any manner, in as much as he is not able to interfere with the evidence or also in such cases where the employer finds it necessary to place an employee under suspension so as to have smooth disposal of disciplinary proceedings.” Holding that a head of a department’s suspension pending inquiry leads to confidence building, the Court observed that the way in which the remark was made “may” constitute sexual harassment, however, it refrained from making any final remarks as the disciplinary proceedings were ongoing. It held that prima facie case was made out for suspension of the petitioner. The Court disposed of the writ petition, directing the petitioner to approach the appellate authority.

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In a significant ruling, the Madras High Court recently held that even an isolated offence of sexual harassment at the workplace must be considered as a ‘continuing offence’ if it is grave in nature and is causing constant trauma and fear in the victim’s mind.

Therefore, such an offence should not be barred by the six-month period of limitation mandated by Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act [PoSH Act], the Court said.

In an order passed on June 11, Justice D Bharatha Chakravarthy said that in most cases of sexual harassment at the workplace, a complainant battles the dilemma of whether to risk making a complaint and face secondary victimisation by those around her or suppress such complaint and live under constant fear and trauma.

It might take the complainant a long time to finally muster up the courage to make a formal complaint and testify before the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) under the PoSH Act.

In the process, the complainant continues to suffer even after the incident of sexual harassment, the judge said.

“Therefore, in such cases where the alleged offence is a grave one, and has caused constant trauma and fear for the victim, the offence must be considered a continuing one, the judge said. Thus, when the offence complained of is a serious one having the effect of causing grave mental trauma and stress to the victim, pushing her to a dilemma not to reveal or complain due to the fear of secondary and tertiary victimization, on the other hand, she is also unable to withstand, swallow or suppress the same, then that state of the victim fits the definition of undergoing continuous sexual harassment. So long she undergoes such a phenomenon; the same is directly attributable only to the perpetrator and therefore would amount to a continuing offence. Such a phenomenon is not just the effect of the act, but is the injury itself,” the High Court said.

Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy apologised to women litigants who were asked uncomfortable questions during cross examination.

The Court was hearing a petition filed by one R Mohanakrishnan, a superintendent in the district police office, in the Nilgiris district in Tamil Nadu, challenging an enquiry report of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) in the rape complaint filed against him by one of his female colleagues.

The petitioner argued that the alleged incident of rape had taken place in April 2018.

But the woman lodged a formal complaint with the local police much later and that was then forwarded by the police to their employer only in December 2022.

Therefore, the ICC enquiry had commenced more than four years after the alleged incident, it was pointed out.

As per the PoSH Act, a complainant can file a written complaint either with the internal or local complaints committee within three to six months of the sexual harassment incident.

Therefore, the ICC proceedings and the enquiry report must stand vitiated by the statute of limitation, the petitioner argued.

The State government opposed the plea.

The Court agreed with the State’s submission that the woman had been traumatised by the incident and had confided in some colleagues.

It had taken her much counselling to finally lodge a complaint.

Even after the complaint, someone had “leaked” a copy of the complaint on YouTube without masking her name and the complainant had lived in constant fear of her family coming to know of the incident and resultant secondary victimisation by the society, the Court noted.

“The instant case is not an isolated incident of misconduct such as passing lewd remarks or inappropriate touching etc. In such a solitary instance, the victims cannot be permitted to withhold and exercise their right of remedy to their wish and time, thereby preventing the delinquent employee from having a fair and impartial hearing to be in a position to defend himself effectively. Whereas in cases of serious allegations such as rape or continuous molestation or harassment, the same would be a continuing misconduct and every day until the situation is redressed or brought to the notice of the appropriate authority would give rise to a fresh cause of action. The purpose of the provision of Limitation in Section 9 has to be understood in this context. Thus, in this case, I reject the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that merely because the incident happened in the year 2018, the complaint cannot be entertained by the local committee in the year 2022,” the High Court said.

The Court, therefore, refused to quash the ICC enquiry report in its entirety.

However, it noted that the petitioner had not been given a chance to cross-examine all witnesses.

Therefore, Justice Chakravarthy directed that the ICC, which had already concluded its enquiry in the case, must be re-constituted with the same composition as far as possible.

The committee should then address the petitioner’s grievances in relation to the cross-examination of witnesses, the Court said.

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The POSH Committee in the impugned order, had dismissed the petitioner’s complaint on the grounds that it was barred by limitation

In disagreeing with the order of the committee, a single bench of Justice Kausik Chanda directed the committee to reconsider the petitioner’s complaint on merits and pass a reasoned order. The Court stated:

The question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, the issue of limitation could not have been decided by the local committee at the threshold stage without evidence. The local committee, in deciding the issue of limitation, should accept the allegations made in the complaint at its face value. There is no occasion to examine the veracity of the allegations made in the complaint at the threshold stage.

The petitioner, an associate professor at the university submitted that she had filed the complaint in 2023, and submitted an application for condonation of delay in 2024, which was rejected by the committee, since the incidents complained of had occurred between 2019-2023.

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the committee had failed to read the complaint in its proper perspective and misdirected itself in concluding that the complaint filed by the petitioner was barred by limitation, relying solely on the definition of “sexual harassment” as provided under Section 2(n) of the Act of 2013. It was stated that the local committee had failed to take into consideration the definition of “sexual harassment” under Section 3(2) of the Act of 2013.

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that if the complaint filed by the petitioner was read as a whole, it would be apparent that the petitioner had alleged several incidents of implied or explicit threats of detrimental treatment in her employment.

It was argued that the Respondent-VC had also interfered with her work and created an intimidating and hostile work environment for her. The petitioner has also been subjected to humiliating treatment affecting her health and safety. It was argued that the committee did not take into consideration the definition of “sexual harassment” under Section 3(2) of the Act of 2013 and erroneously held that the complaint of the petitioner was barred by limitation.

Counsel for the university supported the findings of the local committee and stated that nothing has been alleged in the complaint that occurred after April 2023, in relation to or connected with any act or behaviour of sexual harassment.

Therefore, it was stated that the alleged incidents of victimization having no nexus with sexual harassment cannot extend the period of limitation. Counsel further submitted that the committee had considered the complaint of the petitioner as well as the reply filed by the respondent-VC and came to a factual finding that no act of sexual harassment took place beyond April, 2023.

The documents produced before the committee with the reply of respondent-VC make it clear that none of the incidents alleged to have taken place after April, 2023, have any nexus with the act or behaviour of sexual harassment. Therefore, the findings of the committee should not be interfered with by this Court, it was stated.

Counsel on behalf of the respondent-VC, submitted that the petitioner herself filed an application for condonation of delay and the committee was not satisfied with the explanation provided by the petitioner in her application, and as such, the petitioner at this juncture cannot contend that her complaint was not barred by limitation.

It was stated that since the petitioner could not sufficiently explain the delay in filing the complaint, the local committee has rightly rejected the complaint.

In perusing the submissions and order passed by the local committee, the court found that the order made by the POSH committee dismissing the petitioner’s complaint on the grounds of limitation could not be sustained.

In looking into the concept of limitation under the POSH act, the court referred to the petitioner’s complaint and stated that it was evident that the local committee did not consider the incidents that allegedly took place after April, 2023 as “sexual harassment.”

In my view, the incidents alleged to have taken place between April, 2023 and December 21, 2023, suggest that the petitioner has been subjected to threat of detrimental treatment in her employment and respondent no.7 has created an intimidating, offensive and hostile work environment for her. In the present case, the allegations made in the complaint clearly suggest that the circumstances of victimisation and detrimental treatment allegedly taken place between April, 2023 till December, 2023 have a nexus with the alleged sexual harassment of the petitioner between September, 2019 to April, 2023. Therefore, if the complaint is read as a whole, would lead to a conclusion that the same was within the period of limitation in terms of Section 9 (1) of the Act of 2013, the Court held.

Accordingly, the plea was allowed and the local committee was directed to reconsider the petitioner’s complaint and deliver a verdict on merits.

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Facts of the Case
In this case, a complaint of sexual harassment was filed by a female employee against the respondent. The complaint was initially submitted to the Inspector General (IG) and subsequently forwarded to several authorities, including the DG SSB, New Delhi, Dy. IG, SSB, SHQ, Tezpur, and the Chairperson of the National Women Rights Commission, New Delhi. The first complaint was filed on August 30, 201. On September 18 2012, the complainant also submitted a second complaint containing additional allegations against the respondent.

Two initial inquiries, a fact-finding inquiry and a Frontier Complaints Committee inquiry, failed to substantiate the allegations. Subsequently, the Ministry of Home Affairs constituted the Central Complaints Committee to investigate the matter. The Central Complaints Committee had to be constituted in view of Clause 9 of the 2006 Standing Order. Clause 9 of the 2006 Standing Order envisages two levels of complaints committee; (i) a Frontier Complaints Committee for the “combatised and in-field officers” (ii) a Central Complaints Committee for the “non-combatised officers”. Since at the time of lodging of the complaint, the respondent was serving as a non-combatised officer, the Central Complaints Committee was formed. While the Central Complaints Committee’s Inquiry was still pending, the Ministry of Home Affairs annulled the Frontier Level Complaints Committee’s Inquiry Report on the ground that the Chairperson of the said Frontier Level Complaints Committee was of an equivalent rank as that of the respondent.

The Central Complaints Committee found the respondent guilty of sexual harassment.
The respondent argued that the allegations were false and claimed that they were made because he had rejected the transfer application of the complainant. As a result, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) seeking the cancellation of the Central Complaints Committee’s inquiry. However, CAT refrained from expressing an opinion on the matter, as the disciplinary proceedings were still pending.

The case then moved to the High Court, which ruled that the Central Complaints Committee had overstepped its jurisdiction by considering the second complaint and had taken on a prosecutorial role during the inquiry. The High Court stated that the jurisdiction of the Central Complaints Committee was limited to the first complaint filed by the complainant and it should not have considered the allegations made in the second complaint. The High Court also found that the committee’s findings were based on surmises and conjectures, characterizing the case as “No Evidence.” Against this order, the Supreme Court was approached.

Findings By The Supreme Court

1. Courts Should Not Get Swayed By Discrepancies and Hyper Technicalities
In its order, Supreme Court ultimately held that the High Court’s judgment was incorrect, and the Central Complaints Committee had not exceeded its jurisdiction by considering the second complaint. The High Court’s decision was set aside, and the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was upheld.

At the outset, the Supreme Court underlined the gravity of addressing workplace sexual harassment, emphasizing that offenders should not evade legal consequences. The court noted that failure to hold harassers accountable could be distressing for victims, particularly when the wrongdoer faced minimal penalties or remains unpunished. However, the court also recognized the challenge in verifying such allegations, stating that such allegations were easy to make but difficult to disprove. Thus, the court stated that when someone claimed false implication for ulterior motives, the court had a duty to thoroughly examine the evidence and determine the credibility of the accusations.
The Court underlined the importance of not being swayed by insignificant discrepancies or hyper-technicalities when reviewing such cases. It stressed that allegations of this nature should be considered within the broader context of the entire case. The Court also cautioned against showing undue sympathy or leniency towards the individual accused of misconduct.

Regarding the consideration of additional or second complaints, the Court highlighted that this issue is a separate matter to be evaluated based on whether it was filed promptly and not mischievously at a later stage to cause prejudice to the accused. In the specific case at hand, the Central Complaints Committee was established on August 6, 2012, and its first hearing took place on September 25, 2012. The second complaint, filed by the complainant, was submitted on September 18, 2012. This timeline indicated that the second complaint had been promptly submitted shortly after the Central Complaints Committee’s formation and before its first hearing.

The Court emphasized that the Central Complaints Committee’s authority was derived from the 2006 Standing Order, not solely from the complaint itself. Furthermore, even if it were assumed that the committee’s existence was contingent upon the complaint, Clause 10(i) of the 2006 Standing Order envisaged the possibility of filing a complaint with the committee. This indicated that a complaint could be submitted to the committee after it had been constituted. The court further held that in the context of departmental inquiries, strict and technical rules of evidence and procedure did not apply in the same manner as they would in a regular court of law, where witnesses are examined under oath. The Court emphasized that there should be no aversion to considering “hearsay evidence” as long as it had a reasonable nexus and credibility in the case at hand.

2. Role of Courts in Evaluating Validity of Disciplinary Proceedings Limited
In evaluating the validity of the disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court emphasized that the primary fact-finding authorities in such cases are the inquiry authority and the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the role of the court, in its power of judicial review, should not be to act as an appellate body or reevaluate the evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the fact-finding authorities. Instead, the scope of judicial review is limited to assessing the propriety of the decision-making process and the fairness of the inquiry procedure.

The Court also highlighted the limited jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters. It stated that the High Court should not function as an appellate authority or replace its own findings with those of the disciplinary authority. Interference by the High Court is only warranted under specific circumstances, added the Supreme Court– “It is no doubt true that if there is “no evidence” or the decision is “so unreasonable that no reasonable man could have ever come to it”, or the decision is “so outrageous” in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it “or that it is so absurd that one is satisfied that the decision-maker must have taken leave of his senses”, it calls for interference by a competent court of law.”

3. Impact of Procedural Violation to Be Weighed Against Overall Fairness of Inquiry
The Supreme Court then turned its attention to the question of whether the respondent was asked by the Central Complaints Committee if he pleaded guilty to the allegations presented in the second complaint. The High Court had noted that while the respondent was asked about his plea regarding the allegations in the first complaint, there was no evidence to suggest that a similar exercise had been undertaken concerning the second complaint.

The Supreme Court clarified that the obligation of the Authority to ask the accused whether they pleaded guilty or had any defense was only applicable if the accused had not admitted any of the charges in their written statement of defense or had not submitted any written statement of defense. In the case under consideration, the respondent had indeed filed a written statement of defense addressing all the allegations outlined in the ten points examined by the Committee. Furthermore, the respondent had cross-examined all the witnesses regarding these allegations.

The Court opined that in case of a mere violation of a procedural rule, no prejudice could be claimed to have been caused to the respondent even if it was assumed that he was not asked to plead guilty to the second complaint. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had overlooked the principles established by the Court and had unreasonably set aside the disciplinary authority’s punishment order. This was done without applying the “test of prejudice,” which should have been employed to assess the impact of the procedural violation on the respondent’s rights and the overall fairness of the inquiry.

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Presiding Officer Ajay Goel rejected the appeal moved by Pachauri who expired in the year 2020 during the pendency of the case. His legal representatives were brought on record.

The Tribunal upheld the findings and observations made against Pichauri in the final inquiry report dated May 19, 2015, submitted by the Internal Complaints Committee and said that there was no illegality and infirmity in the same. “The perusal of report further shows that ICC has carefully examined and perused the SMSs and e-mails exchanged between both the parties and concluded that such repeated attempts to foster personal relationship with reporting employees is not only a conflict of interest and misuse of designation, it also amounts to a violation of the prevention of sexual harassment policy,” the judge said.

A complaint was filed before ICC in February 2015 by a woman who was employed as Research Assistant with Pichauri, accusing him of sexual harassment. However, Pichauri challenged the final inquiry report on the ground that it was abuse of principles of natural justice and that the enquiry was conducted in predetermined and haste manner.

Dismissing the appeal, the judge said that the impugned report and proceedings of ICC showed that the Committee followed all principles of natural justice and served as a neutral body and conducted proceedings in a fair manner.

“From the reports of ICC and the documents available on record, it is apparently clear that the punishment inflicted are based on deposition and testimonies of witnesses examined in proceedings and the grounds raised in the appeal are not sufficient to set aside the findings of ICC,” the Tribunal said.

It noted that the allegations against Pichauri, regarding sexual conversation and inappropriate conduct at workplace, were supported and corroborated by various e-mails and text messages exchanged between him and the complainant on various dates.

“So it is clear that appellant was misusing his designation and his behaviour was causing discomfort and harassment to complainant. The clear picture which emerges is that a “Man” should know the difference amongst explicit consensus by woman and her explicit “No” or her implied consent. In the present matter, the whole conversation and evidence points towards nothing but to the fact that appellant was thrusting on the complainant which was not at all appreciated by complainant,” the judge said.

The Tribunal added: “If it was the consent of complainant, she would never had come forward with the complaint. Numerous instances are available which are not repeated in the judgment but have been gone through by the Tribunal. The appellant has physically as well as emotionally blackmailed complainant. The words used by the appellant clearly shows the sexual harassment of complainant which were not to be liking of complainant.”

It was also observed that Pichauri was at very good position and should have been extra vigilant in his conduct.

“He should have been setting example in the institution but to the contrary, he had rather violated the dignity of the woman by committing sexual harassment which cannot be ignored by the court and cannot be endorsed. So the arguments of appellant are not tenable,” the Tribunal said.

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In hearing a contempt application filed by the complainant/petitioner against the accused, his company and its agents, a single-bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya directed the respondents/contemnors to prove that they had not been in “contumacious violation” of the Court’s orders, and that the impugned appraisal report was unconnected to the charges under the POSH Act, invoked by the petitioner against the accused/contemnor no 5. It was held:

“A person against who a complaint of sexual harassment has been made cannot, under any circumstances, be a party to the performance appraisal of the complainant…Rule 8(a) of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 specifically empowers the Complaints Committee to recommend restraining the respondent from reporting on the work performance of or writing the confidential report of the aggrieved woman. The work has to be assigned to another person. The 2013 Act strives to secure a safe environment to a woman in her workplace. The acts of the alleged contemnors have made a mockery of the object of the Act and the safeguards introduced therein.

Before going into the allegations and counter charges made by the parties, the alleged contemnors, particularly the alleged contemnor no. 5, must prove that there has been no contumacious violation of the judgment and order passed by this Court on 11th August, 2022 and must also show that the alleged contemnor no. 5 that the performance appraisal of the petitioner was unconnected to the charges levelled by the petitioner against the alleged contemnor no. 5.”

Brief facts of the case:

The applicant/petitioner in these contempt applications had accused respondent/contemnor no 5 of sexual harassment at the workplace, under several sections of the POSH Act, 2013.

During the pendency of the aforesaid matter, the petitioner/complainant claimed that the accused/contemnor no 5 had allegedly participated in an appraisal process of the complainant, while her petition was still being heard by the Court. Subsequently, judgement of the Court was delivered on the 11th of August 2022.

It was argued by the accused/contemnor no 5, that he was not the only person who participated in the appraisal process, and that his appraisal of the complainant had been reviewed by one of his colleagues, contemnor no 3. As such, it was submitted that such a review and a subsequent improvement in the scores of the petitioner would point towards impartiality in the review process, and that the status of the contemnor no 5 as an accused, would have no bearing on the appraisal of the complainant.

Observations of the Court

In holding that the actions of the accused in taking part in an appraisal process of the complainant was squarely against the provisions envisaged in the POSH Act, 2013, Justice Bhattacharya noted that even an improvement and review of grades or scores of the complainant would not give the entire process a look of impartiality or purity, since the very participation of the accused in the appraisal process would have vitiated it altogether. The Bench opined:

“The alleged contemnor no. 5 is admittedly a party to the appraisal made of the petitioner’s performance from December, 2021 – 31st March, 2022. The petitioner had levelled allegations of sexual harassment against the alleged contemnor no. 5. The defense taken on behalf of the alleged contemnors is that the appraisal was reviewed by the alleged contemnor no. 3 with an improvement in the scores and gradation. The very fact of the improvement would stand testimony to the subversion, prima facie, of the checks against sexual harassment under the 2013 Act.

Admittedly, the appraisal was prepared while the writ petition filed by the petitioner was being heard by the Court. The result of the appraisal was completed and uploaded on the website of the company for being viewed by the petitioner before the Court delivered the judgment in the writ petition on 11th August, 2022. The appraisal was uploaded on 30th July, 2022. The factual sequence leads to the presumption of foul play. The alleged contemnor no. 5 participating in the appraisal vitiates the process altogether…It is inconceivable that the alleged perpetrator arrogated to himself the power to assess the performance of the complainant at the work place and influence the petitioner’s future prospects.”

Accordingly, the contemnors were directed to keep the appraisal report of the complainant under strict confidentiality such that no person in the company could circulate or make the proposal known to anyone within the company, which could have a bearing on the outcome of the contempt application.

Matter has been listed for further hearing on 4th August 2023.

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In deliberating over the instant matter wherein the petitioner had challenged the order passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate rejecting to discharge him from the charges of sexual harassment and fraud levelled by the complainant, the Bench of M. Nagaprasanna*, J., expressed his disbelief at the probability of any sexual contact or offence in open places- “The places of sexual contact that is depicted in the complaint is what shocks. The places are at Mindtree office, Forum Mall-Koramangala, Barton Center, all of which are open places. The petitioner sexually abusing the complainant in such open places cannot but be an allegation that is highly improbable”. Invoking State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Court decided to obliterate the charges against the petitioner as the alleged offences lacked any foundation.

The petitioner was working in the post of Delivery Center Manager at Mindtree Company Limited. The complainant joined the said Company to work under the petitioner on a contract that was to be in subsistence between 26-04-2017 and 11-08-2017. Just before the contract of the complainant could come to an end, a complaint was registered against the petitioner. It was alleged that the petitioner promised to convert the complainant’s contractual job into permanent one, but he went back on his word. It was further alleged that the petitioner made sexual advances towards the complainant and later refused to marry her. The petitioner challenged the registration of crime in the High Court and while this petition was pending, the police filed a chargesheet against the petitioner under Section 354-A and 420 of IPC. The petitioner then went to the concerned Court to seek discharge, but the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate rejected his application.

Perusing the facts of the case, the Court expressed its shock at the probability of open spaces being a place for commission of sexual offences. The Court further noted that neither the complaint nor the charge sheet prepared by the Police, indicated any ingredient of offence of outraging a woman’s modesty. Regarding charges under Section 420, IPC, the Court pointed out that the allegation of the complainant that the petitioner has cheated and breached the promise of marriage, is plainly contrary to law, as breach of promise of marriage cannot become an offence under Section 420 IPC. With the aforesaid assessment, the Court held that the charges and proceedings against the petitioner lack any foundation therefore they ought to be quashed.

Download the Judgement copy here: Karnataka HC-Quashing criminal compliant-False and Malicious intent (5957 downloads )

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Download the judgement copy here Tripura HC - Shila Debnath vs National Institute of Technology (1534 downloads )

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